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Writing the Circle: Judicially Convened
Sentencing Circles and the Textual
Organization of Criminal Justice
Emma Cunliffe and Angela Cameron
Les juges de premiere instance qui travaillent dans des communautes autochtones
eloignees du Grand Nord canadien utilisent des cercles de determination de
la peine, convoques Judiciairement, pour recueiliir de information et des
recommandations quant a la sentence dans des dossiers de violence intime.
Les adeptes pretendent que ces cercles de determination de la peine, convoques
judiciairement, constituent une pratique de justice reparatrice qui aide a retablir
i'harmonie entre la personne contrevenante, sa communaute ainsi que la victime
de la violence. Les adeptes voient aussi dans les cercles de determination de la
peine un outil qui permette un resultat juste, tout en minimisant I'incarceration
des hommes autochtones. La sociologue feministe Dorothy Smith a mis au point
une methodologie pour determiner si les priorites institutionnelles que les
tribunaux etablissent et approuvent lors des cas de determination de la peine
protegent adequatement les femmes autochtones, victimes de violence intime
recurrente dans leurs communautes. Ayant etabli que les experiences de violence
des femmes sont largement exclues du champ d'interet institutionnel, nous
suggerons que les cercles de determination de la peine, convoques judiciairement,
presentent une solution d'une simplicite trompeuse au probleme complexe et de
longue date des rapports des autochtones avec I'appareil judiciaire. II est done
important de repliquer au discours selon lequel ces cercles de determination de la
peine aident a retablir I'harmonie dans les communautes. Le present article
contrecarre cet argument de deux manieres: d'abord, en exposant le fait que les
experiences et les connaissances des femmes sont exclues du forum judiciaire des
communautes autochtones dans ces cas et ensuite, en reaffirmant que toute
solution au probleme de la violence intime doit etre confue dans un cadre plus
vaste d'elimination de la pauvrete et des repercussions de la colonisation dans ces
communautes.
Trial court judges who work in remote northern Canadian Aboriginal
communities use judicially convened sentencing circles to gather information
and develop sentencing recommendations in some intimate violence cases.
Proponents claim that judicially convened sentencing circles are a restorative
justice practice that heals the offender, his community, and the survivor of the
violence. Proponents also look to sentencing circles as a tool to fmd a just
outcome that minimizes Aboriginal men's incarceration. We use a methodology
developed by feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith to consider whether the
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institutional priorities being established and approved by courts in sentencing
circle cases provide adequate protection for Aboriginal women against recurrent
intimate violence in their communities. Finding that Aboriginal women's
experiences of violence are largely excluded from the realm of institutional
concern, we suggest that judicially convened sentencing circles present a
deceptively simple solution to the complex and longstanding problem of
Aboriginal people's experiences with the Canadian criminal justice system. It is
therefore important to counter the discourses that claim that judicially convened
sentencing circles have the potential to restore Aboriginal communities.
This article counters that discourse in two ways: first, by identifying that
Aboriginal women's experiences and knowledge are being excluded from the
judicial construction of Aboriginal communities in these cases; and, second, by
reasserting that any solution to the problem of intimate violence must be part of a
broader effort to overcome poverty and the legacy of colonialism within
Aboriginal communities.
Introduction
Using a feminist socio-legal methodology drawn from Canadian sociologist
Dorothy Smith, this article examines judgments written in sentencing circle
cases about intimate violence.' Sentencing circles function as a judicially
constructed alternative to a conventional sentencing hearing. They are most
often used by non-Aboriginal judges who work in northern Canadian
Aboriginal communities. We consider all of the available decisions^ (ten in
total) in which a judicially convened sentencing circle was used as a step in the
process of sentencing Aboriginal men for perpetrating intimate violence
against their female partner or former partner. We find that Aboriginal
This article is partly based on concepts and original research developed by Angela Cameron
during her doctoral work. Both authors thank the organizers and participants ofthe workshop at
which this article was first presented and the reviewers and editors whose helpful comments on
earlier drafts greatly improved the final article. Angela also gives special thanks to the girls and
women at the FREDA Centre for Research on Violence against Women and Children for their
inspiration during 2006.
1. In this article, we use the term "intimate violence" to denote physical, sexual, emotional,
financial, psychological, or spiritual abuse by adult males of adult female partners in intimate
relationships. We follow Anne McGillivray and Brenda Comasky, Canadian feminist legal
scholars, in using this term in lieu of wife battering, battered woman syndrome, wife abuse,
spousal assault, family violence, domestic abuse, domestic assault, and domestic violence.
Intimate violence is used instead because it speaks to the close, personal relationship between
abuser and survivor, and "the relationship of deep trust presumed to exist among family
members, between intimate partners." Anne McGillivray and Brenda Comaskey, Black Eyes
AU of the Time: Intimaie Violenee, Aboriginal Women and the Justice System (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999) at xiv.
2. By "available," we mean that the decision is available through Quicklaw or Westlaw or is
reported in a Canadian law report and that the decision refers to the use of a sentencing
circle. A judge will invariably deliver sentencing remarks, but those remarks are not
necessarily catalogued within Canadian legal databases.
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women's voices and experiences are inadequately represented in the judgments
written by trial court and appellate judges about the conduct of sentencing
circles and the sentences they recommend. We suggest that this under-
representation presents real challenges to the institutional construction
of sentencing circles as a restorative practice that provides a more just
means of sentencing Aboriginal offenders.
In the face of an occasionally overwhelming emphasis on discursive
constructions of subject identity within criminal law, we retain a sense that the
people who participate in criminal cases have a life outside the textual record
of their time in court. Our goal is to find traces of this life within the textual
record, to think about how the textual record is incomplete, and to explore
what this incompleteness reflects about criminal courts' priorities. There are
several methodological reasons to focus on the texts of sentencing circle
decisions, even as partial and biased accounts of the sentencing circles they
report. Since we began in our respective research projects to seek out materials
within the "public" processes of the criminal law,^  we each discovered that
these materials were extremely hard to come by for various bureaucratic and
legal reasons. We soon realized that texts of the type we sought were rare and
valuable. When texts do exist, access to them is restricted (in the case of
judgments) to an elite group of those, such as ourselves, whose institutional
affiliations permit them to use the costly services that catalogue Canadian case
law. In the case of other texts, such as transcripts, probation reports, medical
records, and so on, obtaining access is always expensive, time consuming, and,
frequently, simply impossible. Despite the fact that we are often unable to
obtain access to these texts, they shape the criminal justice process in highly
significant ways, not least by promoting certain institutional concerns to the
exclusion of others.'*
We have found it productive to add Smith's work on texts to the armoury of
tools available to feminist legal scholars. Smith argues that texts are the
technology that permits the coordination of governance, and her methodol-
ogy—institutional ethnography—demonstrates how this process works in
practice. This article first introduces some key aspects of Smith's theory and
methodology, before describing the practice of judicially convened sentencing
circles in more detail. We then turn to the texts of sentencing circle decisions.
Guided by Smith, we suggest how we might read judgments written about
sentencing circles in light of the institutional work that the texts perform.
3. In Emma Cunliffe's work, these are transcripts and court records of court cases dealing with
mothers accused of killing their children, and in Angela Cameron's work, these are statistics
and records of restorative justice interventions in intimate violence cases.
4. This article is therefore written subject to the realization that, by the time a judge writes a
judgment such as those we consider, the range of decisions open to the judge is constrained
by a number of factors. We can identify some of these factors, such as the requirements of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code]. Others, such as the case-specific
information placed before the judge, are not necessarily wholly apparent from the decisions.
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We conclude that a feminist legal practice of textuality informed by Smith's
work has the potential to produce a more nuanced understanding of law's
institutional hierarchy and of the infinitesimal mechanisms by which women's
voices continue to be discredited within the law.
Texts and Feminism
Feminist tradition has given socio-legal scholars a rich understanding of
the need to record women's knowledge and to include this knowledge within
elite discourses such as law.^ We suspect, however, that we are not alone in
feeling concerned that women's knowledge continues to be disendorsed within
law despite the strides that have been made in understanding and
disseminating women's perspectives. We share Smith's belief that the technol-
ogy of textuality is central to the mechanisms by which these perspectives are
excluded from the realm of law's institutional concern.
Smith's contribution is best understood by returning to a conversation that
has engaged feminist legal theorists for many years. In 1992, Carol Smart
published "The Woman of Legal Discourse" in the first issue of the journal
Social and Legal Studies.^ In this article. Smart argues that seeing law as
discursively constitutive of gender identities allows us to grasp how law brings
"into being both gendered subject positions as well as [more controversially?]
subjectivities or identities to which the individual becomes tied or associated."^
Smart considers that regarding law as a gendering terrain permits us to
understand the apparent contradictions within law's engagement with women
and might help feminists to contest law's more negative constructions of
gender identities. Others have built on Smart's work, arguing that legal
practices and discourses "give life to specific gendered selves that are
subsequently disciplined and regulated through law."^
5. For a spirited defence of this proposition, see Linda Kealey et al., "Teaching Canadian
History in the l990's: Whose 'National' History Are We Lamenting?" (1992) 27 Journal of
Canadian Studies 129. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychotogicat Theory and
Women's Devetopment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), has had a
significant influence on feminist socio-legal methodology. See, for example, Carol Smart,
"Losing the Struggle for Another Voice: The Case of Family Law" (1995) i8 Dalhousie Law
Journal 173; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Feminization of the Legal Profession: The
Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers," in Richard Abel and Phillip Lewis, eds..
Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories, volume 3 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1989), 196. Gilligan also has some important feminist critics. See, for example, Isabel
Marcus et al., "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law: A Conversation," James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture Series, State University of New York in Buffalo, October 1984
(1985) 34 Buffalo Law Review 11.
6. Carol Smart, "The Woman of Legal Discourse" (1992) I Social and Legal Studies 29.
7. Ibid, at 34.
8. Dorothy E. Chunn and Dany Lacombe, "Introduction," in Dorothy E. Chunn and Dany
Lacombe, eds.. Law as a Gendering Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2 at 14.
Vol. 19 2007 5
Some feminists have reservations about embracing discourse theory.
While acknowledging Smart's contributions, Shelley Gavigan suggests that
Smart's woman of legal discourse "has neither experience nor agency: she
has neither breath nor breadth."' In other words, by focusing on the
discursive construction of "Woman" to the exclusion of the experiential
realm, our understanding of women's lives has been "fiattened" and
rendered "unidimensional."'" We share Gavigan's concerns, and part of our
project is to acknowledge and find ways to understand the limitations of
focusing solely on institutional texts as a means of understanding women's
lives.
Susan B. Boyd acknowledges that the idea of discourse allows us to see "the
ways in which power is much more dispersed and localized than we may
previously have thought."" Despite this acknowledgment, she worries that
"discourse analysis... does not give a clear sense of how discourses are
constituted and reproduced, nor how some discourses come to be more
powerful and privileged than others."'^ Boyd adopts Alan Hunt's conclusion
that the notion of ideology contributes an understanding of how "the
particularistic and localised powers and disciplinary techniques [identified by
Foucault and Foucauldian scholars] coalesce or are aggregated at the level of
institutions and of the state."'^ It is the notion of coalescence and aggregation
that is our entry point for this discussion. While understanding law as
ideological''* enables us to see the extra-local consequences of particular
discursive practices, it does not explain the techniques by which these
consequences are secured. Similarly, while the idea that "woman" is a
9. Shelley A.M. Gavigan, "Mothers, Other Mothers, and Others: The Legal Challenges and
Contradictions of Lesbian Parents," in Chunn and Lacombe, eds., supra note 8, 100 at 105.
10. Ibid.
11. Susan B. Boyd, "Some Postmodernist Challenges to Feminist Analyses of Law, Family and
State: Ideology and Discourse in Child Custody Law" (1991) 10 Canadian Journal of Family
Law 79 at 84.
12. Ibid, at 97. See also Gavigan, supra note 9; and Shelley A.M. Gavigan, "Paradise Lost,
Paradox Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian, and Gay
Engagement to Law" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 589.
13. Alan Hunt, "Marxism, Law, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence," in Peter Fitzpatrick, ed..
Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1991), 102 at 107, cited in Boyd, ™;)ra note 11 at 99. See also Eileen Fegan, "'Ideology'
after 'Discourse': A Reconceptualization for Feminist Analyses of Law" (1996) 23 Journal of
Law and Society 173.
14. We use ideological here in two senses. First, law emerges from a field in which social values
and norms are constantly asserted, debated, revised, and struggled over. Second, law is a
bearer or carrier of ideological messages, which gain authority in part from their association
with law's institutionalized legitimacy. These two senses come from Hunt, supra note 13 at
115. Smith uses the word differently—to describe a text or account that serves organizational
interests. Dorothy E. Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of
Knowledge (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990) at 32-45. See also Marie Campbell
and Frances Gregor, Mapping Social Relations: A Primer in Doing Institutional Ethnography
(Aurora, ON: Garamond Press, 2002) at 38^0 .
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discursively constructed concept is propelled by a sense that it matters that
women take certain identifiably patterned forms in law's discourse, it does not
fully articulate the more subtle consequences of exclusion for women's lives
outside the text. In our view. Smith's work provides us with important insights
in relation to both of these questions.
Smith's key contribution, for our purposes, is the insight that texts are the
technology by which an individual activity is connected to, and helps to shape,
broader institutional practices.'^ In the present context, texts form the bridge
between the individual experience of any one survivor with the criminal justice
practice of sentencing circles and the institutional priorities and imperatives
that shape this encounter. According to Smith, "[t]exts are key to institutional
co-ordinating, regulating the concerting of people's work in institutional
settings in the ways that they impose an accountability to the terms they
establish."'^ Texts' ability to perform this institutional role relies on the highly
effective technology of reproducibility and stability. These material properties
permit the text to be distributed widely and read by different people for various
purposes:
It is the materiality of the text itself that connects the local setting at
the moment of reading into the non-local relations that it bears.
Its technology, its system of distribution, and its economy are
foundational to the peculiar property of abstraction that provides
for forms of social relations that have no particular place or time
in which they happen... [t]he text creates something like an escape
hatch out of the actual and is foundational to any possibility of
social forms of abstraction of whatever kind, including this one
written here.'^
For example, the text of a decision by one judge to use a sentencing circle in a
single case might, if it is approved by a superior court or otherwise noticed by
others, form the basis of a decision to adopt judicially convened sentencing
circles as an appropriate method of doing justice in criminal cases that
fit particular guidelines. This insight has two ramifications. First, it is the
reproducibility and stability of texts that enable governance to happen on the
scale and in the form that we experience today—texts actually enable
institutional processes to occur in a coordinated manner.'** A judge who writes
15. Dorothy E. Smith, Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People (Lanham, MD:
AltaMira Press, 2005) especially at Chapter 8. See also Campbell and Gregor, supra note
14 at 31-44.
16. lbid.aiXn.
17. Dorothy E. Smith, Writing the Social: Critique. Theory and Investigations (Toronto:
University ofToronto Press, 1999) at 39.
18. Ibid, at 170.
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a judgment in a particular case has produced a material object that may
be used in many different contexts, by many different people, for many
different purposes. The judgment provides the basis on which the judge is
accountable to an appellate court; it stipulates the actions that must be taken
by those who are implicated within the decision and provides a foundation for
redress if someone fails to do their part; it provides another judge faced with a
similar question with a template for resolving the instant case; and it permits us
to do the sort of analysis that we are undertaking in this article. In each
example, the various actors are guided by copies of the same text, although
they do different things with that text in the course of performing different
institutional roles. None of these actions would be possible if some material
record had not been created by the original judge. Second, the text is created
by people performing their work in a particular physical and institutional
context (in this example, by a judge sitting in a remote court in northern
Canada or in an office further south), and it is activated by other people
performing other work (probation officers, defendants, appellate court judges,
academic commentators, and so on).'^
Texts are hierarchically organized. The simplest example for lawyers is that
a relevant appellate court decision will govern the decisions of lower courts,
but it is also true that an earlier decision must be negotiated by a judge
deciding a later case. The hierarchy of texts is described by Smith as
"a two-way street."^ *^ Texts provide a basis for accountability—lower court
judges are accountable through decisions and transcripts to appellate courts.
At the same time, authoritative texts provide the concepts and categories used
within subordinate texts. Thus, the language and logical structure of lower
court decisions are determined, to a significant extent, by superior court
precedent, statutory requirements, and so on. A notion of the interplay
between higher and lower court decisions meshes well with common law
understandings of precedent. Beyond this superficial harmony with traditional
notions of legal method, however. Smith's reminder about the hierarchical
nature of inter-textuality allows us to glimpse the process by which ideologies
are constituted and perpetuated within legal institutions. The establishment of
institutional priorities and realms of concern within texts, coupled inevitably
with institutional actors' actions in response to these texts, is the process
of constituting and perpetuating ideologies within the criminal justice
system. By directing lower courts to privilege certain concerns and knowledges
above others, superior court decisions help to construct the institutional reality
of the Canadian criminal justice system. In turn, this constructed reality has
tangible effects on the lives of those who become involved in the criminal
19. Ibid, at 177.
20. Ibid, at 186.
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justice system by virtue of their status as defendants, complainants,
and witnesses.
Smith's method also reminds us that texts are connected in ways that our
training as lawyers might not otherwise reveal. For example, by seeing texts as
a product of embodied work practices rather than solely in terms of their
nomenclature ("judgment," "article," "form"), we have begun to question
whether it matters that one of the judges who wrote several of the decisions we
discuss has also written articles and a book promoting the merits of judicially
convened sentencing circles.^' The importance of this observation does not
necessarily stem from an argument that such an activity is right or wrong.
Rather, it arises because seeing the texts in these terms reminds us that judges
are also people and that this judge might have a vested interest in
demonstrating the success of any sentencing circle that he has convened.
In other words, texts are created by people who have lives outside the texts
they create, and they help to govern the lives and actions of others whose
subjectivity is unlikely to be fully captured within the textual record. In each
case, of course, we must recall that the actions of the judge are, in turn,
constrained by the institutional requirements imposed on this judge. Smith's
concept of the text therefore helps us to understand how people contribute
to ruling relations in their daily work'^ ^ and how people's actions are guided
by those ruling relations.
For feminists, this explicit connection between the texts people create and
the work they and others do helps to explain the importance of inserting
women's experiences into the textual record. The objectified knowledge^^
created by texts will thereby have a better chance of including women's
knowledges. Smith, therefore, takes the ethical stance that people should be
regarded as being experts in their own lives and links it to the inevitable
selectivity of institutional realities that are constituted, in large part, through
text. Smith's work accordingly helps us to understand why the effects
of marginalizing a particular woman's experience within a text ramify
beyond the consequences of marginalization for that woman. The textually
constituted institutional reality will thereby exclude certain experiences from
21. Barry Stuart, "Circle Sentencing: Turning Swords into Ploughshares," in Joe Hudson and
Burt Galaway, eds., Restorative Justice: International Perspectives (Monsey, NY: Criminal
Justice Abstracts and Press, 1996), 193; and Kay Pranis, Barry Stuart, and Mark Wedge,
Peacemaking Circles: From Crime to Community (St. Paul, MN: Living Justice Press. 2003).
22. Smith defines "ruling relations" as the objectification of consciousness and energy. Smith,
supra note 15 at 184. "Objectification" means, in this case, the cancellation of the subjectivity
of the knower so that knowledge "moves to an abstract conceptual plane." Marie Campbell.
"Dorothy Smith and Knowing the World We Live In" (2003) 30(1) Journal of Sociology and
Social Welfare 3 at 8.
23. "Objectified" has a meaning that corresponds with the definition of "objectification" given
in the previous footnote.
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the realm of institutional concern.^'* We return to these themes later in our
analysis of the texts of judgments that describe judicially convened sentencing
circles.
Before we turn to the set of decisions we have chosen to explore in this
article, we must explain some ways in which our work departs from the work
of Smith or at least the ways in which it is a partial representation of Smith's
method. Smith calls her method "institutional ethnography," which she has
most recently described as incorporating the following elements:
Working from people's experience of their own doings, knitting
different perspectives and positions together, and exploring the
text-based forms of organization provide means of constructing
representation of how things work. . . [The theme that brings all these
elements together is] the dimensions of ^^
The task with which we are engaged in this article is not a full institutional
ethnography. Rather, we have chosen to conduct a detailed examination
of one of the elements described by Smith—the text-based organization of
judicially convened sentencing circles—and its relation to power. Although our
focus is on a single aspect of institutional ethnography, this aspect might be
better understood if we briefly describe the other elements of Smith's method.
Throughout her career, and the many refinements and restatements of her
method. Smith has primarily been concerned with developing "a method of
social analysis that is reflexive to the material contours of people's lives."^^
In one of her earliest published descriptions of the method, Smith explained
her goals in the following terms:
[T]he aim is to explicate the actual social processes and practices
organizing people's everyday experience. This means a sociology in
which we do not transform people into objects, but preserve their
presence as subjects. It means taking seriously the notion of a
sociology concerned with how the phenomena known to sociology
express the actual activities of actual individuals.^^
Smith resists the scholarly practice of "forgetting" that knowing begins and
ends with an actual, embodied, situated person.'^ '* Instead, institutional
ethnography begins with particular knowledges—the knowledge of the
24. Smith, supra note 15 at 188.
25. Ibid, at 183.
26. Campbell, supra note 22 at 4.
27. Dorothy E. Smith, "Institutional Ethnography: A Feminist Method" (1986) 15 Resources
for Feminist Research 6 at 6.
28. Smith, supra note 17 at 4-5.
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woman who calls 911 after being assaulted by her partner, the knowledge of
the telephone operator who takes the call and decides what information she
must record, the knowledge of the police officer who attends the call, and the
knowledge of the women's shelter worker who might be called to speak with
the complainant.^^
The 911 example leads to the second element of institutional ethnography—
knitting different perspectives and positions together. Smith begins from the
belief that people are a good source of information about the work they do and
the institutional constraints within which they do it. Moreover, in going about
our daily business, "we know how to do, how to go about things, and what we
can get done. . . we know as a matter of doing."'"* What we do not necessarily
know is how our local activities connect to those of others. Alex Wilson and
Ellen Pence put this well when they write that "[n]o one calls 911 to report 'I'm
the victim of an in progress misdemeanour, physical, no weapon, violation of a
protection order,'"^^ Yet the telephone operator who takes a 911 call must
translate what she is being told into these terms. By knitting together the
perspective of the woman who calls 911 with that of the telephone operator,
police, service providers, and others, we can begin to glimpse how institutional
categories operate to exclude certain types of experience from institutional
realities. Texts play a key role here. When the telephone operator takes a call,
she is required to follow a script that runs on a computer screen. Her ability to
record the information she is given is limited to the fields contained within the
script. The bodily experience of being assaulted is transformed at this point
into objectified (textual) knowledge about "an incident." In the process,
depending upon the institutional concerns that are reflected in the text,
important information might be lost.
In order to perform a full institutional ethnography of sentencing circles, we
would therefore need to go well beyond the texts that we discuss in this article.
Our work would include interviewing the various participants and knitting
their knowledges together. We would need to go beyond speculating about
how the institutional order being established within the texts of sentencing
circle decisions excludes certain concerns and conduct an empirical investiga-
tion of what concerns are being excluded and by what means. Such a task is
beyond the ambit of this article.^^ For now, we have contented ourselves with
considering how an ideology—the belief that judicially convened sentencing
29. This is an example that has been worked and re-worked within the institutional ethnography
literature. See, for example. Smith, supra note 15 at 170-3 and 188; and Ellen L. Pence and
Melanie F. Shepard, Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic Violence: Lessons from
Duluth and Beyond (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999).
30. Dorothy E. Smith, "Comment on Hekman's 'Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint
Theory Revisited"' (1997) 22 Signs 392 at 394-5.
31. Pence and Wilson quoted by Smith, supra note 15 at 188 [emphasis in original].
32. Angela Cameron's Ph.D. project undertakes a true institutional ethnography of restorative
justice practices.
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circles lead to more just outcomes in cases of intimate violence within remote
Aboriginal communities—has been constructed and perpetuated within the
Canadian criminal justice system through the texts of sentencing circle
decisions. In pursuing this question, we have paid close attention to the
chronological and hierarchical relationships between the texts we have
considered. Our research does not allow us to do more than speculate about
the material effects of this ideology on gender relations within Aboriginal
communities. Nonetheless, we believe that reading the corpus of judicially
convened sentencing circles with Smith's work in mind leads to some revealing
insights about how the judicial system helps to establish and perpetuate certain
ideologies while marginalizing others.
The Practice: Judicially Convened Sentencing Circles
Sentencing circles are one of a number of alternative sentencing
models currently in use in Canada. While several restorative justice models
employ a talking or healing circle format, our focus is on judicially convened
sentencing circles. This model is most often used in Aboriginal communities
by non-Aboriginal judges in the disposition of criminal sentences where
a fmding or admission of guilt has already been entered.^^ The consistent
use of sentencing circles arose in Canada in the 1990s,^ '* when non-Aboriginal,
activist judges sought alternatives to the conventional sentencing process.'^
This search for alternatives was driven by frustration with the over-
incarceration of Aboriginal offenders from remote Northern communities.
The primary aim was to avoid sending recidivist Aboriginal offenders to prison
in southern Canada. Judicially convened sentencing circles have been adopted
in many courtrooms across Canada and have, in particular, been used in a
number of cases involving intimate violence against Aboriginal
33. Recently, non-Aboriginal offenders have requested the use of sentencing circles. See Les
Perreaux, "Victim Rejects Native Justice for Ex-OfTicers: Sentencing Circle: Man Left in
Cold Asks for $200,000 as Show of Remorse," National Post (National edition) (I December
2001) at A8; and Heather Sokoloff, "Sentencing Circles Gain Judges' Approval; 'It's a Way
of Healing When You Have a Crime That Cuts across an Entire Community,'" National
Post (National edition) (15 May 2002) at A3.
34. judge Cunliffe Barnett recounts having used restorative justice methods as early as 1978.
Cunliffe Barnett, "Circle Sentencing/Alternative Sentencing" (1995) Canadian Native Law
Reporter I at 1-2.
35. Dorothy Harley Eber, Images of Justice (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997);
Stuart, supra note 21 at 193; Claude Fafard, "On Being a Northern Judge," in Richard
Gosse, James Youngblood Henderson, and Roger Carter, eds.. Continuing Poundmaker and
Riel's Quest: Presentations Made at a Conference on Aboriginal Peoples and Justice.
Proceedings of a Conference Held September 1993 (Saskatoon: Purich, 1994) 403; and the
Honorable A.C. Hamilton, A Feather Not a Gavel: Working towards Aboriginal Justice
(Winnipeg: Great Plains, 2001).
36. See R. v. Morris (2004), B.C.C.A. 305, I86C.C.C. (3d) 549 [Morris, cited to C.C.C.]; R. v.
Naappaluk, [1994] 2 C.N.L.R. 143 (Q.C. (Crim. Div.)) [Naappaluk]; R. v. Bennett, [1992]
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The practice follows a fairly consistent format. Participants, sitting in a circle
rather than the conventional courtroom layout, are invited to give information
to the court on the community, the offender, and other relevant circumstances
and are asked to suggest a sentencing outcome. Both the decision to use a
circle in a given case and the ultimate sentencing outcome rest solely with the
presiding judge. Initially, circles were conducted under the judge's common
law sentencing powers. Following changes to the sentencing provisions in
the Criminal Code in 1996, judges now most often use sentencing circles to
satisfy the requirements of section 718.2(e), which calls on courts to consider
alternatives to incarceration for Aboriginal offenders in reasonable
circumstances.^^
The literature discussing the basis, practice, and theory of restorative justice
generally is vast,^^ and we will not attempt to summarize the debates in this
article. The Law Commission of Canada has suggested that it is "a response
to conflict that brings survivors, wrongdoers and the community together to
collectively repair harm that has been done in a manner that satisfies their
conceptions of justice."^^ For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that the
literature on the benefits of restorative justice ranges from extravagant claims
of transformative properties based on anecdotal evidence"" to much more
Y.J. No. 192 (Y. Terr. Ct.) (QL) [Bennett], R. v. Charleyboy, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2854 (B.C.
Prov. Ct. (Crim Div.)) (QL) [Charleyhoy]; R. v. Green, [1992] Y.J. No. 217 (Y. Terr. Ct.) (QL)
[Green], R. v. H.K.C., [1997] S.J. No. 577 (Sask. CA.) (QL) [H.K.C.\, R. v. J.J. (2004)
N.L.C.A. 81, 192 C.C.C. (3d) 30 [J.J., cited to C.C.C.]; and R. v. W.B.T., [1995] 132 Sask. R.
221 (sub nom. R. v. Taylor), 3 C.N.L.R. No. 167 (Sask. Q.B.) (QL) [Taylor trial, cited to
Sask. R.]. Two Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decisions relate to separate phases of the
same case. Milliken J. held a judicially convened sentencing circle in the case of Taylor (this
trial decision is cited above as Taylor). At the conclusion of this circle, Milliken J. deferred
sentencing until a period of banishment had been completed by the offender. The Crown
appealed the decision to defer sentencing. The decision in this first appeal is reported in
R. V. Taylor, [1996] 132 D.L.R. (4th) 323 (sub nom. R. v. IV.B.T), 3 W.W.R. 88 (Sask. C.A.).
The trial judge was ordered by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to proceed to sentencing.
The sentence itself was then appealed by the Crown. The second court of appeal decision
in this case is reported at R. v. W.B.T., [1998] 7 W.W.R. 704 (sub nom. R. v. Taylor),
122 C.C.C. (3d) 376 (Sask. CA.) [Taylor appeal, cited to W.W.R.].
37. Other sentencing provisions call upon courts to consider intimate violence as an aggravating
circumstance. Criminal Code, supra note 4 at s. 718.2(a)(ii).
38. See, for instance, Herman H. Bianchi, Justice as Sanctuary: Toward a New System of Crime
Con/ro/(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit,
Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990);
Jim Consedine, Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (Lyttleton, New Zealand:
Ploughshare, 1995); Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice
(Waterloo, ON: Herald Press, 1990); and Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong,
Restoring Justice (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing, 1997).
39. Dennis Cooley, From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice: A Discussion Paper
(Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 1999) at 25.
40. See Annalise Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice (Vancouver:
LIBC Press, 2004) at Chapter 4, for a detailed analysis and critique of these claims.
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modest statements backed by empirical research.'" In essence, not all
restorative justice practice or theory is created equal.
The proponents of judicially convened sentencing circles clearly frame these
circles as a form of restorative justice.'*^ Practitioners claim that, unlike the
criminal justice system's more standard sentencing processes, judicially
convened sentencing circles can heal the offender, the survivor, and the
community while ensuring that anti-social behaviour (such as intimate
violence) is controlled:
Unlike a formal court-based sentencing, the discussions focus on more
than just the offence and the offender and often include the following
matters.. . What must be done to help heal the offender, the victim
and the community.''^
For the purposes of this article, we resist the claims that judicially convened
sentencing circles are a truly restorative approach to crimes of intimate
violence."^ The texts we discuss in the following sections demonstrate two
striking ways in which judicially convened sentencing circles fail to meet
restorative objectives. First, the sentencing decisions tend to displace the burden
of "healing" the offender onto his community and his family, without providing
any resources to either group to help them with the task of rehabilitating the
offender.''^ Second, rather than facing and seeking to heal the harm done to the
survivors of intimate violence, judicially convened sentencing circles, as they are
represented in the judgments, seem to minimize and deny this harm. These
material effects are reflected in, and, to some extent, created by, the textual
organization of judicially convened sentencing circles.
41. See, for instance, Joan Pennell and Gale Burford, "Feminist Praxis: Making Family Group
Conferencing Work," in John Braithwaite and Heather Strang, eds.. Restorative Justice and
Family Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 108.
42. See, for instance. Territorial Judge Heino Lilies, "Circle Sentencing: Part of the Restorative
Justice Continuum" (paper presented to the third International Conference on Conferencing
Circles and Other Restorative Practices, August 2002) [unpublished]; Stuart, supra note 21 at
193; and Cooley, supra note 39 at 24.
43. Lilies, supra note 42. See also Judge Bria Huculak, "From the Power to Punish to the Power
to Heal," in Wanda D. McCaslin, ed.. Justice as Healing: Indigenous Ways (St. Paul, MN:
Living Justice Press, 2005) 161; and Judge Steven Point, "Alternative Justice: Testing the
Waters" in McCaslin, at 206.
44. While there are more general critiques of the discourses of restorative justice, these are
beyond the scope of this article.
45. For example, the orders made by the trial judge in Taylor trial, supra note 36 at para. 27,
included a provision that a community member must permit the offender to use his house
during the offender's period of banishment, and others were required to spend up to $250 per
month on food for the offender. In Naappaluk, supra note 36 at 15-16, the trial judge referred
to the cost savings that might ensue from judicially convened sentencing circles as one of the
benefits of the practice.
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It is clear that, even by standards set by some other restorative justice
advocates, sentencing circles fall short in a variety of ways."*^ Despite these
shortcomings, sentencing circles have been embraced by numerous lower court
judges,'*^ various Canadian governments,'*** and almost every court of appeal''^
as a bonafide model of restorative justice. This endorsement is risky because
categorizing judicially convened sentencing circles as restorative justice acts as
a frame by which the circle practice is interpreted as helping to secure
restorative objectives, regardless of the fact that circles actually operate more
ambivalently. The categorization also accords the practice legitimacy within
the Canadian criminal justice system. As restorative justice practice grows
internationally, and Canada is regarded as a leader in using restorative justice
to deal with intimate violence, it is important to avoid using the label
"restorative justice" as a substitute for careful consideration of the possibilities
and limitations of specific models or practices.^ *^
The Texts of Judiciatty Convened Sentencing Circte Judgments
As Smith would predict, we know about judicially convened sentencing
circles largely through their textual representation—most importantly, in the
form of judgments written by trial court and appellate court judges. Another
side of these reported cases is, of course, the actual embodied experiences of
46. Jonathan Rudin, "Aboriginal Justice and Restorative Justice," in Elizabeth Elliott and
Robert M. Gordon, eds.. New Directions in Restorative Justice: Issues, Practice. Evaluation.
Proceedings of International Conference on Restorative Justice Held 2003 (Cullompton, UK:
Willan Publications, 2005), 89; and Jane Dickson-Gilmore and Carol LaPrairie, iVill the
Circle Be Unbroken? Aboriginal Communities, Restorative Justice and the Challenges of
Conflict and Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
47. See, for instance, Pranis, Stuart, and Wedge, supra note 21; Eber, supra note 35; Stuart, supra
note 21 at 193; Fafard, supra note 35; and Hamilton, supra note 35.
48. British Columbia, for instance, has adopted a restorative justice approach in intimate
violence cases where "the case is not likely to produce a conviction or the victim is unwilling
to testify." The Honorable Geoff Plant, "Reforms to Spousal Assault Policy" (2003) 61 The
Advocate 589 at 590. Alternative measures, which may include sentencing circles, are used in
these circumstances.
49. See, for instance, R. v. B.L. (2002), A.B.C.A. 44, [2002] 6 W.W.R. 602; R. v. Williams, [1998]
M.J. No. 482 (QL); R. v. Johns, [1996] 1 C.N.L.R. 172 (Y.K.C.A.); Morris, supra note 36;
R. V. Morin, [1995] 101 C.C.C. (3d) 124 (Sask. C.A.) [Morin\, J.J., supra note 36; R. v.
Nunner, [1976] 30C.C.C. (2d) 199 (Ont. CA); R. v. Hudson, (1982) O.C.A. Oral Judgment, 7
January [copy on file with the authors]; R. v. Muise, [1994] 94C.C.C. (3d) 119 (N.S.C.A.);
and R. v. Sangster, [1973] 21 C.R.N.S. 339 (Que. C.A.). There has never been a sentencing
circle case heard at the Supreme Court of Canada. Leave to appeal was denied in R. v. Joyea
(2004), S.K.C.A. 17, 241 Sask. R. 178, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No.
i30 (QL). For a brief Supreme Court of Canada commentary on sentencing circles, see R. v.
Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at para. 74.
50. In the therapeutic context, a similar point is made by Alan Jenkins, "Shame, Realisation and
Restitution: The Ethics of Restorative Practice" (2006) 27(3) Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Family Therapy 153 at 153. Jenkins argues that, when we speak of restoration, we
must ask: "To restore what? For whom? For what purpose? And, in whose interests?"
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women who participated in the circles by virtue of their role as the survivor of
the defendant's violence. These experiences cannot be accessed through an
examination of the judgments we discuss in this article. The chief problem with
which we are concerned is therefore not so much that we cannot see what was
actually performed, embodied, or understood by the women participants but,
rather, that judges are claiming to write an authentic and complete account of
the circle when, in fact, this account clearly omits these women's experiences.
Most troubling is the fact that critics of judicially convened sentencing circles,
including Aboriginal women's groups, have suggested that survivors of
violence are not protected and supported in the circle.^' This risk is given
sparse attention in the judgments that we have read.
Smith believes that institutionally authorized, textual accounts such as
sentencing circle decisions function to create a hierarchy of accounts. The
experiences of those who participate in the circle itself are subordinated to the
written account of the judge: "Such practices render organisational
judgment... into objectified textual rather than subjective processes."^^ The
process of objectification helps to obscure the fact that these authoritative texts
are themselves socially constructed,^^ and yet the process is integral to the
coordination and functioning of what Smith refers to as ruling apparatuses.^''
Smith asks us to call into question how and why a particular version becomes
authorized^^ and how this process of authorization can "be seen as organising
a course of concerted social action."^^ Therefore, it is not our aim to insert the
woman back into the circle. Instead, we wish to examine what social actions or
institutional concerns are privileged in the authoritative, objectified accounts
of sentencing circles. We wish to examine how "the institutional account, that
is, the sequence of action described in a properly mandated form, embeds and
subsumes the observational mode."'^
We are concerned with the fact that the institutional accounts produced by
judges about judicially convened sentencing circles marginalize and, at times,
exclude Aboriginal women's perspectives on intimate violence. We point to the
relative absence of women from the texts created by trial judges and consider
51. Mary Crnkovich, "A Sentencing Circle" (1996) 36 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial
Law 159; and Wendy Stewart, Audrey Huntley, and Fay Blaney, The Implications of
Restorative Justice for Aboriginal Women and Children Survivors of Violence: A Comparative
Overview of Five Communities in British Columbia (Vancouver; Aboriginal Women Action
Network, 2001). See also Morris, supra note 36.
52. Dorothy E. Smith, Texts, Facts and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling (London:
Routledge, 1990) at 214.
53. Ibid, at 210.
54. "The ruling apparatuses are those institutions of administration, management, and
professional authority, and of intellectual and cultural discourses, which organise, regulate,
lead and direct, contemporary capitalist societies." Jbid. at 2.
55. Ibid, at 24-6.
56. Ibid. dini.
57. Ibid, at \53.
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the shape women take when they do appear in the judgments. In many of the
cases, it is not clear if the complainant was present or, when she was noted as
being present, if she said anything at all. In other cases, the judge portrays the
survivor's role as being more active and supportive of the process than others
perceive.^* With the backing of institutional discourse and power, trial judges
are willing and able to claim that they have captured the Truth of the
sentencing, thereby further obscuring the silencing of women and the gaps in
representation. The use of restorative justice discourse acts to bolster these
truth claims. By repeatedly writing within the institutionally authorized
account that they are engaged in a healing process, it becomes possible for
judges to subordinate the actual experiences of the participants to the textual
account of the circle. While, in this article, we cannot hear and interpret the
voices of these women, we can analyze the institutional "truth" reflected in the
text of these judgments and consider how this truth is both created and
perpetuated by text-based institutional practices.'^
While restorative justice is used to deal with cases of intimate violence in
Canada,^ *^ it rarely generates either publicly accessible processes or records.
Since most restorative justice models are by nature extra-judicial, any records
that are kept are not publicly accessible. We turned to the ten sentencing circle
decisions we discuss in this article because they represented a coherent body of
law, which extended over more than a decade, and because (not insignificantly)
we were actually able to find and read them.^' Furthermore, they represent a
key reference source regarding the practice of judicially convened sentencing
circles—not just for us but also for criminal law practitioners, judges, and
others who might be interested in understanding the state of Canadian
Aboriginal criminal justice practice.
Three aspects of the texts suggest that the decisions construct and
perpetuate a particular institutional ideology. First, the claims being made
by trial judges who adopted judicially convened sentencing circles are couched
in different language from that which we are accustomed to reading in
judgments. Second, we were troubled by the relative absence of the female
complainants from trial judges' accounts of sentencing circles. Third, when the
complainants do appear in these texts, we were interested to see how they, and
58. Compare Crnkovich, supra note 51, with the judgment in Naappaluk, supra note 36. This
point is discussed further later in this article, in the text accompanying notes 85-8.
59. We are suspicious of "Truth" but not of "small-t truths." This inquiry is conducted in the
spirit of epistemological modesty described by Valverde: "The opposite of'lies' is not Truth,
but rather 'truths."' Mariana Valverde, Laws Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003) at 8-9.
60. Angela Cameron, "Stopping the Violence: Canadian Feminist Debates on Restorative
Justice and Intimate Violence" (2006) 10 Theoretical Criminology 49.
61. The cases listed in note 36 were reported and relatively easy to find, given our access to the
appropriate online resources. Most were accessible on Quicklaw, with some searching. These
represent almost all of the reported sentencing circle cases available involving intimate
violence.
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their role in the proceedings, were characterized. Appellate court judges
counter the trial judges' tendency to obscure the episodes of intimate violence
that engaged the judicial system by making this violence reappear in the texts
of appellate judgments. That said, while the appellate decisions accord
institutional importance to the over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders,
they do not give adequate consideration to the need to protect the survivor
from further harm. This relative lack of institutional attention to the survivor's
welfare has implicitly authorized trial courts to continue ignoring Aboriginal
women's concerns about the effects of judicially convened sentencing circles on
survivors of intimate violence.
Legitimizing Judicially Convened Sentencing Circles
The cases discussed in this section represent all of the judicially convened
sentencing circle decisions involving intimate violence in Canadian Aboriginal
communities that were available to us.^^ While the chronology is ragged, the
cases fall into two broad phases. These phases trace the history of the
introduction of judicially convened sentencing circles into the field of intimate
violent cases. Several trial judgments record the first use of judicially convened
sentencing circles in this field during the early 1990s." A phase of
consolidation then occurred during the mid- to late 1990s when appellate
courts began to hear and decide appeals from sentencing circle decisions in
cases of intimate violence in Aboriginal communities.^ The early trial
decisions contain few citations to case law or authority, aside from several
references to R. v. Moses.^^ In Moses, Justice Barry Stuart set out guidelines to
help trial judges decide whether a given case is one in which a sentencing circle
should be used and explained the process to be followed when conducting a
sentencing circle. Moses was a case involving theft, carrying a weapon with the
purpose of assaulting a police officer, and breach of probation. Stuart J. did
not suggest whether the Moses guidelines applied to intimate violence. The first
few sentencing circles reported in the context of intimate violence, however,
use the guidelines and process set out in Moses. The texts of these early
decisions in intimate violence cases show that the trial judges apply the Moses
process without explicitly considering whether a process established in the
context of theft and threatened assault of a police officer translates well to
cases involving intimate violence against a spouse or former partner.^^
62. By "available," we mean either officially reported in law reports or included on the Quicklaw
or Westlaw database of decisions until 1 September 2006.
63. The first use of a judicially convened sentencing circle in an intimate violence case involving
spousal assault was in 1996 and is reported in Bennett, supra note 36.
64. The first relevant court of appeal decision is R. v. Johnson, [1995] 2 C.N.L.R. 158
(Y.K.C.A.).
65. R. V. Moses, [1992] 71 C.C.C. (3d.) 347 [Moses].
66. See Bennett, Green, Charleyboy, and Naappatuk, all cited supra note 36.
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The second phase represented in the case law is one in which appellate
courts are asked to decide whether judicially convened sentencing circles may
be legitimately employed in cases of intimate violence. In their decisions, the
appellate courts begin to set out the criteria for deciding whether a circle
should be used. As we discuss later in this article, the appellate courts tend to
direct trial courts to modify their practice in this phase, but they ultimately
approve sentencing circles as an appropriate form of sentencing practice in
intimate violence cases arising in remote Aboriginal communities. What is of
most concern is the fact that appellate courts have evinced a weak commitment
to making the willing and voluntary participation of the survivor a pre-
condition to conducting a sentencing circle or to requiring other measures that
might ensure that Aboriginal women's perspectives are given adequate space
within the circle.
One of the most striking characteristics of the decisions written by trial
judges who adopt judicially convened sentencing circles is the colourful
language used to justify the place of the circle within the criminal justice
process. While judicial decisions are characteristically dry and somewhat
modest in their language, the trial judgments that constitute the first phase of
this case law are emotive, at times verging on religious, in tone. For example,
in R. V. Naappaluk, the judge describes how "the 'consultation circle' gradually
became a 'healing circle,' that is, a session in which an attempt is made to solve
certain problems through discussion."^^ In most cases, the judge focuses on the
transformative effect of the circle on the life and outlook of the offender:
I heard some moving statements last night. And I was also told that
things really have changed in recent months.^^
[T]he sentence of the Court today is a sentence which tries to get
behind you and help you with this initiative, this first step you have
taken to try to change your life.^'
On other occasions, the judgment focuses on the gains made by the community
and the Canadian justice system from the experience of participating in a
judicially convened sentencing circle:
Well, this is the day, Michael, we cut fish. This is the day we end this
process. This process has heightened on [sic] awareness within the
community that they have the best tools to deal with their community
problems, and equally this process has heightened the awareness
within the justice system that we need to listen to the community.™
67. Naappaluk, supra note 36 at I I .
68. Charleyboy, supra note 36 at para. 14.
69. Bennett, supra note 36.
70. Green, supra note 36.
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The circle of healing, and the potential for transformation ostensibly offered
by judicially convened sentencing circles, is being extended to include the
offender, his community, and the Canadian criminal justice system. Notably,
as we discuss later, the immediate survivor's particular needs for healing are
mostly omitted from this realm of concern or, at best, are assumed to follow as
a natural consequence of the offender's healing. When we consider these
judgments more closely, it will also become apparent that the offender's
"community" is defined in a way that excludes Aboriginal women and their
concerns about physical safety in general.^'
Given that we have not spoken to the trial judges who wrote these texts, we
can only speculate about why they have abandoned the more usual style of
legal writing in these decisions. Our best guess is that this language reflects a
genuine conviction that judicially convened sentencing circles have the
potential to accomplish more positive change within Aboriginal communities
than traditional sentencing practices. The abandonment of the detached legal
style seems to reflect a commitment on the part of the judges to becoming a
part of the healing process instead of perpetuating the harms caused by the
incarceration of Aboriginal Canadians. These judges are apparently combining
their institutional authority with a personal search for a better way of doing
justice. The commitment is reflected in the somewhat unconvincing claim that
the sentencing circle is a place where the participants meet as equals, leaving
social hierarchy behind:
All participants in the session sit in a circle, with neither table nor desk
in the centre, so that they all appear on an equal footing: nobody
dominates anybody else by seeming to preside at a table, and nobody
is in the background. Everyone looks at everyone else and dialogue is
easier. Participants remain sitting while they speak, they speak in their
own language as long as they wish and they are not interrupted by
translation, which takes place only at the end of each contribution to
the discussion.'^
It is possibly necessary for the judges to make these claims in order to
legitimize the place of judicially convened sentencing circles within the
Canadian criminal justice system.
The second phase appellate decisions manifest a very different tone from
that of the trial decisions. For the most part, these appeal decisions are more
typically "legal" in style. In many cases, the appellate court finds that the trial
judge had erred, either in approaching the task of deciding whether to hold a
71. For more discussion on the perils of defining community, see Carol LaPrairie, "The 'New'
Justice: Some Implications for Aboriginal Communities" (1998) 40 Canadian Journal of
Criminology 61; and Acorn, supra note 40.
72. Naappatuk, supra note 36 at 6.
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sentencing circle^^ or in the sentence that was ultimately handed down.^'* While
the appellate courts tinker with the trial judges' practice, they share trial
judges' concern at the over-incarceration of Aboriginal ofTenders and
implicitly approve their belief that judicially convened sentencing circles
offer an opportunity to ameliorate the effects of criminal justice on remote
Aboriginal communities.^^ In a series of judgments since 1994, appellate courts
have legitimized the practice of judicially convened sentencing circles as a
means of seeking alternative forms of justice for Aboriginal offenders and have
accepted trial judges' claims that circles constitute a form of restorative justice.
Particularly given the more neutral tone that is adopted in the appellate
judgments, this acceptance of sentencing circle practice has served to objectify
the practice in Smith's sense. In other words, the appellate judgments accord
the claims made by trial judges about the positive potential of judicially
convened sentencing circles a legitimate, depersonalized status within the
Canadian criminal justice system. As might be expected, however, appellate
courts continue to emphasize the trial judge's obligation to exercise an
overriding discretion to impose a sentence that accords with the sentencing
principles contained in the Criminal Code.
The appellate courts do seem uncomfortable with some of the more
sweeping claims made by trial judges, particularly the judges' claim to
understand the needs of Aboriginal communities:
It is also, in my respectful view, mistaken to impose a sentence with
the hope that it will somehow bring a community together, when the
appropriateness of such a sentence is a significant source of division
within that community. This approach forces the community to react
to the sentence, rather than responding appropriately to the needs,
capacities and understandings of the particular community.^^
Notwithstanding these compunctions, appellate courts tend to permit the
sentencing decision made by a trial judge after conducting a sentencing
circle to stand, even where they would have reached a different result.^^
In particular, appellate courts have refused to set sentencing circles aside in
73. Morin, supra note 49, R. v. Cheekinew, [1993] 80C.C.C. (3d) 143 (Sask. Q.B.), and Taylor
appeal, supra note 36, which set out the criteria that should be used in determining whether a
sentencing circle is appropriate for the particular case. These criteria are usefully collected
and summarized in Rowe J.A.'s decision in J.J., supra note 36 at para. 34.
74. For example, Morris, supra note 36. In J.J., supra note 36, the court of appeal did not
consider the fitness of the sentence because the accused seemed to have "turned around his
life" (at para. 77). The appellate decision, however, seems to indicate that the court would
likely have found the sentence inadequate.
75. See, for example, Morris, supra note 36 at para. 52.
76. Ibid, at para. 66.
77. See, for example, Taylor appeal, supra note 36 at para. 83—4, and J.J., supra note 36 at
para. 76.
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cases where it is clear that the survivor was reluctant to participate.^ ** The net
effect is that judicially convened sentencing circles now form a legitimate mode
of acquiring pre-sentencing information in certain cases that involve
Aboriginal offenders from remote northern communities.
Textual Absence: The Survivor (within) the Trial Judgment
Claims made within the trial judgments about the transformative effects
of the circle rarely extend to the survivor of intimate violence. In fact, little
attention is paid in trial decisions to the effect of the violence, the circle, and
the sentencing decision on the survivor. In this section, we suggest that
survivors can be read as being absent from the texts of trial judgments in three
ways. First and most simply, in two of the trial decisions, the judge makes no
reference whatsoever to the presence or absence of the survivor in
the sentencing circles. Second, in several decisions, the trial judge records
that the survivor was present when the sentencing circle occurred but fails to
describe the nature and extent of her participation or to record her words.
Finally, the trial decisions overwhelmingly disregard the need to ensure that
the sentencing circle is conducted in a way that reassures the survivor of the
community's concern for her safety and emotional well-being. This disregard
occurs even when research about the needs of survivors of intimate violence is
placed before the court by women's groups or other concerned third parties.
This most complex form of absence is also the most insidious. Women's lived
experience of violence is being silenced within these decisions, and women's
expertise about their own needs is being denied.
It is unclear from the trial decision in R, v. Bennett whether the survivor was
present at the sentencing circle.™ The only mention of the survivor is a
reference to the fact that she was assaulted. No custodial sentence was imposed
by Stuart J. in this case, despite the fact that this was the offender's third
assault against the same spouse. In his oral reasons for judgment, Stuart J.
explained that no custodial sentence would be imposed because "you can keep
your word, and... you are not someone who in the past has been bad, and
78. For example, Taylor appeal and J.J., both supra note 36. In Taylor appeal, the majority of
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that, while the survivor's original unwillingness to
participate in the circle may have constituted a procedural irregularity, the fact that (in the
majority's opinion) the survivor became a willing participant in the circle after the circle was
commenced cured that irregularity. See Taylor appeal, at para. 66. The Newfoundland and
Labrador Court of Appeal decision in J.J. is ambiguous, but the court stipulated that "the
willingness ofthe victim (freely given)" (at para. 34) is a criterion to be considered in deciding
whether to hold a sentencing circle. In this case, the court concluded that the survivor did not
freely consent to the circle and that the trial judge did not have regard to this or other
relevant criteria. Nonetheless, the court refused to set the sentence aside because the offender
"has stopped drinking. He has not reoffended. He is taking care of his children. He appears
to have turned around his life" (at para. 77).
79. Bennett, supra note 36.
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since the commutiity seems to respect you."**" In this case, previous episodes of
intimate violence evidently do not qualify as past bad behaviour. Since the
judgment does not record any information about the survivor, we cannot
know from the text how she felt about this construction or about the sentence
that was imposed upon the offender.
The decision in R. v. Taylor is a second judgment that fails to state whether
the survivor participated in the circle, although the judge does note that she
did not want to do so.^' Justice Robert Milliken also cryptically reports that
"[t]he Crown and certain individuals opposed the holding of the circle."*^
Milliken J.'s omission is clarified by the majority of the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal in the Taylor appeal, which noted that
the victim at first did not want to participate in the circle proceedings.
She participated only because she felt she had to. After she learned
that she was not compellable, however, she continued to participate.
Significantly, she appeared on the date to which the proceedings were
adjourned, 29 May, and again participated. At this point she clearly
became a willing participant.^^
The majority of the Court of Appeal also notes in its decision that the survivor
stated: "I felt I had to come. I felt like I was forced to come."^"* We return
to this aspect of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's reasoning later in this
article.
In several instances, the trial judgments record that the survivor did
participate in the sentencing circle. In these cases, however, women's
participation seems to have had a minimal impact on the institutional account
of the circle. Survivors' voices are barely afforded space in the written account,
and their opinions and concerns seem to be given little weight in the final
sentencing decision. The absence of survivors' voices is particularly notable as
judges often use verbatim quotations from the circle process in these decisions
or paraphrase the participants' words. Despite the claims made by trial judges
that everyone is an equal participant within a sentencing circle, the relative
or complete absence of the woman survivor from many of the trial decisions
suggests one or both of two conclusions. First, it is possible that
the complainants' contributions are not fully recorded or not given
weight by the trial judge. Second, it is possible that women feel constrained
from participating actively in the circle because of fear for their personal
safety.
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The judges in R. v. Green, Naappaluk, and R. v. Morris^^ note the presence
of the survivor in the circle but only peripherally record her experiences, her
words, or her concerns. In Naappaluk, Justice Jean Dutil writes that "[t]he
accused himself spoke several times, as did the victim, his wife."**^ However, an
observer of the circle process and the steps leading up to it suggests that the
survivor was silenced through intimidation and fear. The observer, Mary
Crnkovich, writes: "[I]t is interesting to note how seldom the victim spoke.
When she did speak she said very little."**^ In R. v. Charleyboy, Justice Cunliffe
Barnett notes that the survivor participated in the circle, but the only remark
attributed to her in the written judgment assigns her partial blame for this
second prosecuted assault by her husband: "I was told that Lena had said that
she would never allow it to happen again.""^^
In the final set of cases, the trial judgments record that the survivor actively
participated in the sentencing circle. There are, however, two troubling aspects
to the ways in which women participated. First, in cases such as R. v. H.K.C.,
Taylor, and R. v. 7.7.,*^ the appellate courts identify the likelihood of survivor
coercion, noting that pressure was brought to bear on women who did not
wish to become members of the circle. The survivor's concerns about
participating are rendered invisible by proceeding without her consent, and
her appearance in the text must be read in light of her participation under
duress. Justice Bria Huculak, a sentencing circle advocate, notes that "(t)he
victim must also be willing to participate—and without any coercion or
pressure to do so."'*^ Despite such expressions of "best practices" in the
literature, survivors in these cases were pressured or coerced into participating
in the circle. Research on intimate violence indicates that the circumstances
leading up to the circle, and in the circle itself, may have silenced the
survivors.^' There are suggestions within some of the cases that Aboriginal
85. Green, Naappaluk, and Morris, all supra note 36.
86. Naappaluk, supra note 36 at 8.
87. Crnkovich, supra note 51 at 166.
88. Charleyboy, supra note 36 at para. 9.
89. H.K.C., Taylor, and J.J., all supra note 36.
90. Huculak, supra note 43 at 163.
91. Research shows that survivors frequently use silence as a survival strategy when interacting
with abusers and sometimes as a coping strategy when dealing with authority figures.
Stephen Hooper and Ruth Busch, "Domestic Violence and the Restorative Justice Intiatives:
the Risks of a New Panacea" (1996) 4 Waikato Law Review 101; Hilary Astor, "Swimming
against the Tide: Keeping Violent Men out of Mediation," in Julie Stubbs, ed.. Women, Male
Violence and the Law (Sydney: Institute of Criminology, Sydney University Law School,
1994) 147; Maria R. Volpe, "Mediation in the Criminal Justice System: Process, Promises
and Problems," in Harold E. Pepinsky and Richard Quinney, eds.. Criminology as
Peacemaking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 194 at 201; Sandra A. Goundry
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women's groups have raised related concerns or presented similar research
before trial judges when opposing a proposal to convene a sentencing circle.^^
In each case, having identified when such opposition has been made, the trial
judge has proceeded with the circle without making any special accommoda-
tion to alleviate the survivor's concerns. Threats to personal safety, as well as
actual violence, affect a survivor's ability and willingness to speak up during a
senteneing circle or to report violence following the imposition of conditions in
a circle. Before survivors are asked to participate in sentencing circles and the
sentences that result from them, sentencing circles, and the circumstances
surrounding them, must be seen by survivors to be safe as well as actually
being safe for the survivors.
In H.K.C., the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal notes:
The defence applied for a sentencing circle to which the Crown
objected on the basis of R v. Morin... and also because the victim was
in a cycle of violence which might have precluded her from meaningful
participation... Contrary to his undertaking, the respondant did
contact the victim and the victim ultimately indicated to the Court
that she did not wish to participate in or to have a sentencing circle
take place. The Court elected to proceed with a sentencing circle, but
during the course of it, concluded it was no longer appropriate to
carry it on as a judicial proceeding.^^
The court held that the lenient sentence imposed by the trial judge should be
set aside, but it did not in this case provide any direction to trial courts about
whether a sentencing circle should take place when a survivor is not a willing
participant in the process.
The need (or otherwise) for the consensual and full participation of
the survivor is discussed at length in the decision in Taylor, with Milliken
J. ruling that the willing participation of the survivor is optional. The trial
decision states that the sole purpose of the circle is to address the needs of
the offender: "A circle may be held even if the [survivor] is opposed to i t . . . the
primary purpose of the circle is to help an accused change lifestyles.
Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation" (1990) 7 Mediation
Quarterly 317; and Linda Perry, "Mediation and Wife Abuse: A Review ofthe Literature"
(1994) II Mediation Quarterly 313.
92. For example, Morris, supra note 36 at para. 27; and Taylor appeal (per Cameron J.A.), supra
note 36.
93. H.K.C., supra note 36 at para. 2. The court of appeal goes on to note that despite cancelling
the circle, the trial judge went on to hand down a "lenient" sentence and speculates that the
trial judge did so due to the community having "abandoned a local justice committee,"
resulting in the accused losing the probable advantages provided by such a committee
(at para. 3).
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The presence of the [survivor] is not crucial."^'' This position is at odds with
the claims made by proponents that sentencing circles heal the survivor, the
offender, and the community. On appeal, the majority of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal concluded that, while proceeding without the survivor's
consent constituted an irregularity, this irregularity was cured by the fact that,
in the majority's opinion, the victim eventually became a willing participant
in the circle.^ ^ Justice Stuart Cameron, in dissent, disagreed, stating that
Milliken J. "should have [aborted the circle] on learning that [the survivor] was
unwilling to participate."^^
In several cases, the dynamics leading up to, during, or following the
sentencing circle left women in situations that were both potentially and
actually dangerous. While these dynamics left women unprotected from
violence, they also created circumstances that may have compromised their
ability and willingness to speak up in the circle. In Bennett, Charleyboy, Green,
H.K.C., Naappaluk, Taylor, and J.J.,'^^ the charges of intimate violence in the
case at hand were preceded or accompanied by at least one, and up to sixteen,
other charges for similar offences. In each of these cases, aside from Taylor, the
survivor had been subjected to intimate violence at the hands of her partner,
the offender had been charged and convicted, and the offender had repeated
the offence. In the case of Taylor, the accused had been convicted of two
serious assaults against a previous common law spouse and one against the
ex-spouse's child.
In H.K.C., the offender was under a no-contact order prior to the
sentencing circle itself, which he breached by contacting the survivor directly.
In the cases of Green and J.J., the offenders were under conditions from a
previous sentencing circle for a similar crime against the same survivor. In
Naappaluk, the offender stayed in the home of the survivor the night before the
circle.^ * In most of these cases,^ ^ abusers remained in the (often small and/or
remote) community with the survivor, increasing the likelihood of contact as
well as the opportunity to assault her. In several cases, the accused remained in
the community under the supervision of those in the community who had
"turned a blind eye" on the abuse previously or had engaged in survivor-
blaming behaviour.'""^
In Taylor and J.J., the offender pled not guilty to charges that included
violent sexual offences, forcing the survivor to testify and endure a full trial.
94. Taylor trial, supra note 36. While the survivor submitted a victim impact statement in Morris,
supra note 36, she did not participate in the sentencing process.
95. Taylor appeal, supra note 36 at para. 66.
96. Ibid, at para. 158.
97. Full citation for each of these cases is supplied in note 36.
98. See Crnkovich, supra note 51 at 168.
99. With the exception of the Taylor trial, supra note 36, where the accused was banished to a
remote island.
100. See, for instance, Naappaluk, supra note 36.
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In these cases, the sentencing circle was ordered by the judge after the offender
was found guilty. It has been suggested by several pro-circle commentators
that a guilty plea be a prerequisite to a sentencing circle."" This proposition
was rejected by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in the Taylor appeal.
The court of appeal held that although it was necessary for "the offender to
demonstrate his remorse, sincerity and acceptance of responsibility . . . a guilty
plea was not necessary.""*^ The court of appeal's endorsement of the use of
sentencing circles in cases in which a survivor has testified against the offender
creates a strong impression that the realm of institutional concern in these
cases excludes women's knowledge. In their rush to heal the offender,
Canadian courts are constructing a discourse that reserves no clear place for
hearing, and finds no clear ways to accommodate. Aboriginal women's
concerns about safety.
All of these circumstances, combined with the likelihood of previous,
unrecorded abuse,'°^ would create an apprehension of harm for survivors of
intimate violence. Research on intimate violence shows that for survivors
"remaining silent about abuse and/or accommodation to their abusers may be
important survival strategies.""^'* The trial judgments that we have read
provide no hint that trial judges are aware of these survival strategies or that
trial judges took particular care to avoid placing survivors in positions where
they may have been faced with recurrent violence. To the contrary, it would
seem that, at times, trial judges go to great lengths to keep offenders in their
communities, even when those offenders have a history of repeated violence
and apparent disregard for judicial sanctions.
Textual Presence: Finding the Body, Losing the Mind
Having identified the ways in which the survivor is absent from many of
the trial judgments, it is important to identify that the complainant
occasionally appears in both trial and appellate judgments. These textual
appearances come in forms that are familiar to us because they draw on
enduring tropes of women's selflessness, feminine dependence, and the
disorder presented by racialized women's bodies.'"^ In these constructions of
101. "Prerequisites common to all communities, include an acceptance of responsibility by the
offender, a plea of guilty." Stuart, supra note 21 at 193.
102. Taylor appeal, supra note 36 at para. 50. For commentary on the value and importance of a
guilty plea in restorative justice interventions, see Ross Gordon Green, Justice in Aboriginal
Communities: Sentencing Alternati\es (Saskatoon: Purich, 1998).
103. For instance, in the Naappaluk case, the offender said before the court; "I've been accused
only three.. . or four... times, but 1 have probably beaten my wife more than fifty... times."
Naappaluk, supra note 36 at 4.
104. Julie Stubbs, "Domestic Violence and Women's Safety: Feminist Challenges to Restorative
Justice," in Braithwaite and Strang, supra note 41, 42 at 44.
105. See Sherene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race, and Culture in
Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); and Lisa Sarmas,
yoi. 19 2007 27
the survivor, judges are, perhaps unconsciously, perpetuating dominant
ideologies by selectively valuing certain discourses about Aboriginal woman-
hood.'"^ In addition, when one turns from the trial judgments to the texts of
appellate judgments, a shift becomes apparent. In many eases, the appellate
courts counter the trial judge's construction of the ease by making violence
against women reappear in the official discourse. None of these characteriza-
tions is unproblematic. Unlike the male accused, the female survivor almost
never appears in the judgments as a complex, living, breathing person.
An example of the survivor as a disorderly "squaw" is provided by the
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal's decision in J.J. Speaking for
the court. Justice Malcolm Rowe describes the circumstances leading up to the
sexual assault in the following terms:
Both [the survivor] and J.J. chronically abused alcohol.
On Friday, September 25, they drank throughout the day and into the
night. Just before daylight on Saturday, September 26, [the survivor]
went into J.J.'s bedroom and passed out on one of the two beds there. '"^
It is hard to see why the survivor's alcohol use or the fact that she slept in J.J.'s
room on the night of the assault is relevant to the decision. This appeal was
brought by the Crown against the sentence imposed by the trial judge, and the
facts found by the trial judge do not appear to have been at issue at this stage.
Collectively, the references to the survivor's alcohol use and the fact that she
passed out in J.J.'s room seem to construct a story of this survivor as a woman
who, at the very least, failed to protect herself from J.J.'s violence. This story
resonates unpleasantly with narratives that construct rape victims, particularly
indigenous rape victims, as having "asked for it" by their conduct or the
company they keep.'°^ Correspondingly, the significance of the violence against
J.J. is diminished in this account. The "facts" reeited by the court also overlook
the possibility that the survivor uses alcohol as a means of coping with
the raeism, poverty, and violence that is the quotidian experience of many
Aboriginal Canadians. This possibility is hinted at in the survivor's victim
"Storytelling and the Law; A Case Study of Loulh v. Diprose" (1994) 19 Melbourne
University Law Review 701.
106. Boyd, supra note 11 at 98.
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impact statement, which is quoted elsewhere in the court's judgment. The
survivor is reported as having said: "When I'm drinking, I'm not so scared."'"^
Notwithstanding this explanation, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of
Appeal's recitation of the "facts" decontextualizes the survivor's alcoholism
from its causes.
The forgiving, nurturing woman is a stock character in the texts of
sentencing circle decisions. In Naappaluk, Dutil J. places considerable em-
phasis on the survivor's willingness to have her partner return to the family
home and orders that a committee be set up to assist the couple. This approach
suggests that the judge considers ending the abuse to be the couple's
responsibility and not a problem that the man must face and overcome."°
Similarly, in Charleyboy, Barnett J. refers to the survivor's preparedness to
attend "the Nenqayni Treatment Centre for 6 weeks" together with her abuser
and her children.'" On the strength of the offender's preparedness to seek
treatment, together with evidence that the offender had changed his behaviour,
the trial judge decided not to sentence the accused to a sentence of
incarceration, despite the fact that this assault was committed while the
accused was on probation for a similar assault against the same survivor.
In Green, the survivor is praised for being willing to work with her partner
to help him overcome his difficulties, and Stuart J. observes that "I would not
be serving the best interests of the immediate [survivor] of this offence by
imposing a gaol sentence.""^This statement is interesting because it is one of
the few examples in which a trial judge pays explicit attention to the survivor's
needs. Even when the judge expresses concern for the survivor's needs, it
appears that they are being constructed in somewhat restricted ways. The
survivor's well-being is presumed to follow from the welfare of the offender,
and no regard is paid to the survivor's need for community support and
assistance in her own right. The possibility that the survivor would resist this
judicial construction of what she needs is somewhat speculative, although it is
supported by anecdotal evidence. For example, in Morris, an accused who was
assessed as having a high risk of re-offending was returned by the trial judge
to his community despite the fact that the Kaska women feared that the
sentencing circle would only serve to isolate and further oppress women in the
relevant community."^Similarly, in Taylor, the trial judge's decision to
proceed with a sentencing circle was approved by the majority of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal despite the fact that the Family Service Centre
and the Kikinahk Friendship Centre wrote to the trial judge suggesting that
holding the circle in this case would undermine "the continuing struggle of
109. J.J., supra note 36 at para. 22.
110. Naappatuk. supra note 36 at 11.
111. Charleyboy, supra note 36 at para. 12.
112. Green, supra note 36.
113. Morris, supra note 36 at para. 27.
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Aboriginal women to have violence against them taken more seriously.""''
The court of appeal's refusal to engage with Aboriginal women's fears about
the effects of judicially convened sentencing circles suggests that women's
experience of intimate violence is, paradoxically, being excluded from the
circles that are being convened to heal violence within their communities.
An example of an appellate court's re-insertion of details about the violence
done to the complainant also comes from 7.7."^ In the Newfoundland and
Labrador Court of Appeal's decision, the accused man's female partner is
described in the graphic terms of the assault with which the accused was
charged. The following quote is distressing, but we have decided to use it
because it demonstrates the gravity of the offence and the extraordinary logic
being developed within sentencing circles:
J.J— was convicted of assaulting [his partner] by forcing a beer
bottle into her vagina while she was sleeping. This was the seventeenth
assault by J.J. against [the survivor]."^
The court of appeal's judgment states that the woman suffered physical injury
to her cervix but that she recovered. Despite the fact that her physical injuries
were presumably documented by doctors, Rowe J.A. comments that "[b]ased
largely on [the complainant's testimony], J.J. was convicted of sexual assault
with a weapon.""^ This remark implicitly casts doubt on the strength ofthe
conviction and certainly downplays the distressing effect of the incident on the
survivor. In this case, the court of appeal found that A.M.P., the survivor, was
pressured by her children and her community to participate in the sentencing
circle. The court of appeal decision proceeds as follows:
In the light of this, was [the survivor's] willingness to participate
freely given?
In the view of the trial judge it was. He states in his sentencing
decision:
There was no evidence whatsoever that there was any coercion or
pressure or any subtle influence of any party against any other party
in the [sentencing] circle.
Strictly speaking, that is true. The pressure applied to [the survivor]
was not in the sentencing circle, it was in the steps leading up
toit."«
114. Taylor, supra note 36 at para. 106.
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Rowe J.A. then proceeds to consider the next issue that was raised in the
appeal. The presumably ironic statement at the end of the quoted passage
leaves us uncertain about whether the court of appeal considers the type of
pressure that was applied to the survivor in this case to be a reason to avoid
using sentencing circles. In the result, Rowe J.A. held that the trial judge failed
to consider factors that were relevant to the question of whether a sentencing
circle should be held, but he refused to rule that a sentencing circle should not
have been held. In light of the good behaviour of the offender since sentencing,
the court of appeal decided not to sentence him to a term of imprisonment.
The graphic description of the violence perpetrated against the survivor,
coupled with Rowe J.A.'s almost joking reference to the coercion brought to
bear on the survivor, combine to dehumanize her and, in particular, to obscure
the psychological effects on the survivor of a relationship in which she had
been physically assaulted at least seventeen times.
The Morris case also provides a striking example of both the disappearance
of the violence against the survivor at trial level and the BC Court of Appeal's
pre-occupation with the physical, rather than the mental or emotional, effects
of the violence. In this case, the BC Court of Appeal overturned the trial
decision, which had imposed a suspended sentence and probation on the
offender after he was convicted of uttering threats, assault, and unlawful
confinement. The sentence was imposed in consultation with a sentencing
circle. The court of appeal opened its decision by making the physical violence
against the survivor re-appear as being an important, aggravating factor to be
considered in sentencing."' In particular, the court focused on the ongoing
physical effects of the assault on the survivor:
E.D. spent three days in hospital recovering from her injuries. At the
time of sentencing at the end of February 2004, almost eight months
after the assault, she continued to suffer ongoing difficulties, such as
occasional blurring of her '^ *'
J.J. and Morris are very different from the trial court decisions that we read
insofar as they document the injuries suffered by the survivor as well as the
events that led up to the sentencing circle. However, even in J.J., the gravity of
the assault is diminished by the statement that the survivor has recovered from
her injuries. In both J.J. and Morris, the courts focus only on the physical
effects of the violence. In these cases, the female survivors are depicted almost
exclusively as the sites of violence and are plainly denied the agency and
psychological dignity that is the ostensible ambition of restorative justice
practices. In stark contrast with the trial judges' concern for the psychological
119. Morris, supra note 36 at paras. 9-13.
120. Ibid, at para. 13.
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healing of the offender and his community, the psychological effects of
intimate violence on the survivor are repeatedly denied in both trial and
appellate judgments. The survivor's role in these cases is limited, even when she
plays some role. She is a body to be abused—a source of support for the
offender while he is mending his ways—her actions courted the violence
against her. Her presence accords the circle an implicit legitimacy, however
reluctant this presence may be. She is, however, rarely a person with needs and
fears and her own right to be healed.
A Different Voice: Hearing and Endorsing Some of Women's
Concerns about Sentencing Circles
One decision provides a significant exception to the appellate courts'
routine endorsement of trial courts' marginalization of women's concerns from
sentencing circles. This decision is written by Justice Stuart Cameron in dissent
in the Taylor appeal. In this case, the offender had broken into his ex-partner's
house. He punched and kicked her severely in the chest and groin before having
forced intercourse with her. He then threatened to kill the survivor if she told the
police.'^' The offender pleaded not guilty, and, accordingly, the complainant
testified and was cross-examined at trial. After a sentencing circle was held
against the survivor's wishes, the trial judge sentenced the offender to ninety
days imprisonment and three years of probation. One condition of probation
was that the offender spend six months in isolation. The Crown's appeal from
the sentencing decision was dismissed by a majority of the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal. Cameron J.A. wrote a dissenting judgment, in which he indicated
that a proper sentence for such an offence would ordinarily be four years'
imprisonment, less time served.'^ •^ Cameron J.A. described the relationship
between the offender and the survivor in some detail, explaining that the
offender "was a binge drinker, thought [the survivor] lazy and irresponsible, and
was often abusive."'" The dissent goes on to describe the offender's previous
convictions for violence against women and to conclude that
[t]hese are grave offences, grave because they constituted
offenses against the person; grave because they inflicted immense
physical and emotional suffering, degradation, and torment upon
their victim.
W.B.T. was to be taken as.. .acting upon a set of lawless,
self-regarding, and brutish attitudes, misogynistic even, given
121. Taylor appeal, supra note 36 at paras. 3 ^ (per Bayda J.A.) and para. 96-8 (Cameron J.A.).
122. Ibid, at para. 95.
123. Ibid, at para. 96.
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the contemptuous views and physical abuse he reserved for both
Ms. C. and the woman with whom he had earlier lived.'^'*
Cameron J.A.'s judgment rejects the validity of those misogynist views.
Furthermore, Cameron J.A. does not confine his consideration of women's
experiences to that of the survivor in this case. He places considerable
emphasis on the fact that both the Family Service Centre and the Kikinahk
Friendship Centre wrote to the trial judge requesting that no sentencing circle
take place in the absence of a willingness by the complainant to participate:
The Centre was also of the view that the events would be treated too
lightly by a sentencing circle, undermining the continuing struggle of
Aboriginal women to have violence against them taken more seriously.
Saying that Ms. C. had already been traumatized by the assaults upon
her, Ms. Sanderson went on to say she feared that Ms. C. would suffer
further traumatization, should she have to participate in a sentencing
circle and that the community did not have adequate professional
support to deal effectively with a case such as this.'^^
Cameron J.A.'s judgment recognizes expertise within the women's groups in
the community and suggests that any true community-based justice initiative
concerning intimate violence must begin from that expertise. In doing so, it
demonstrates the extent to which Aboriginal women's experience and expertise
is excluded from the other judgments we discuss in this article. While Cameron
J.A.'s judgment draws attention to the exclusion of women's voices from
sentencing circles, we believe that it does not provide a template for a truly
restorative approach to sentencing Aboriginal men for intimate violence. Some
of the criteria by which such an approach should be judged are described in the
conclusion.
Conclusion
Using Dorothy Smith's conception of texts as a technology that directs
people's everyday work'^^ has helped us to move beyond the question of
whether or not judicially convened sentencing circles deserve the label
"restorative justice" and into a more productive examination of whose
interests are being advanced, and whose interests obscured, by the institu-
tionally authorized practice of sentencing circles. In the push and pull over
when and how to conduct sentencing circles that is taking place in the texts
written by appellate and trial judges, institutional priorities are being set.
124. Ibid, at paras. 176-7.
125. Ibid, at para. 106.
126. Smith, supra note 15; and Smith, supra note 17.
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These priorities begin from the position, constituted within appellate court
judgments, that judicially convened sentencing circles can be an appropriate
means of proceeding with cases of intimate violence in remote Aboriginal
communities. The priorities established within the texts have a direct effect on
the practice of sentencing circles. For example, the appellate courts' weak
commitment to ensuring that survivors are voluntary participants in a
sentencing circle process seems to have further enabled trial judges to disregard
women's physical and emotional safety when convening sentencing circles.
Cameron J.A.'s dissent in the Taylor appeal highlights the virtually total
exclusion of women's perspectives from most of the judgments that are written
about judicially convened sentencing circles. Thinking about these cases as
establishing patterns of governance permits us to see how the appellate courts'
ambivalence about the role of survivors allows trial judges in later cases to
hold sentencing circles in circumstances that may be inappropriate.
The selectivity evident in the judicial discourse about judicially convened
sentencing circles is perhaps a necessary consequence of any "top-down"
solution to the difficulties inherent in the encounter between Aboriginal
Canadians and the criminal justice system. Judicial commitment to restorative
justice motivates a selection of narrative strands that confirm the "healing"
properties of restorative justice. It also enables the omission of these nar-
ratives, particularly the survivors' actual experiences of safety and feelings
about participation that might reflect poorly on sentencing circles. The judges'
disavowal of the power differentials between judges and the Aboriginal people
who come before them do little to alter the reality that these circles are
convened by non-Aboriginal judges wielding institutional authority. A key
difficulty is that sentencing circles are being used in communities that are
already replete with deprivation and inequality. The exclusion of women's
concerns from the circle mirrors the disempowerment of Aboriginal women
within many communities.'^^ It is important to resist the characterization of
judicially convened sentencing circles as a form of restorative justice because
this characterization re-victimizes Aboriginal women.
Smith's methodology helps us to read the texts of sentencing circle decisions
with an eye to the institutional consequences of factors such as the appellate
courts' ambivalence about whether the survivor must willingly participate in a
sentencing circle. First and most importantly, these judgments demonstrate
that judicially convened sentencing circles now claim a legitimate place in
the armoury of sentencing practices available to Canadian trial judges.
The continued use of these circles by trial judges in a number of northern
127. See Angela Cameron, "Sentencinjg Circles and Intimate Violence: A Canadian Feminist
Perspective" (2007) 18 479 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law [forthcoming], for a
more detailed consideration of this point. Non-Aboriginal society in Canada is also
characterized by gendered inequality, including intimate violence.
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Canadian jurisdictions is a consequence of the authorization given to their use
in texts created by the appellate courts.
The judicial discourse that appears within the cases is different from the
narratives created extra-judicially by proponents of judicially convened sent-
encing circles. Judicial commentators describe idealized models that follow
"best practices" in advocating for sentencing circles, with particular reference to
protecting and empowering the victims of crime.'^^ Both real concern for the
survivors ofthese violent crimes and adherence to the "best practices" described
in the literature are immeasurably compromised within judicial narratives in the
cases discussed earlier in this article. These differences reflect the institutional
imperatives of the criminal justice system since those imperatives are interpreted
by judges. When considering the effect of judicially convened sentencing circles
on Aboriginal experiences of criminal justice, it is therefore important to look at
the practice as it is constituted through the judgments rather than focusing
solely on the rhetoric employed by the circle's proponents. Returning to Hunt's
notion of ideology as a coalescence of discourse at the level of the state,'^^ we
can discern from these judgments that the apparently neutral restorative justice
discourse operates to shield judicially convened sentencing circles from critical
appraisal. One particularly disquieting effect of this institutional ideology is that
Aboriginal women and those who are concerned with Aboriginal women's
safety have been disciphned to accept the practice of doing justice through
sentencing circles because the alternative is to risk being constructed as being
insensitive to the over-incarcaration of Aboriginal men. By constructing the
discourse in this way, the trial and appellate courts have neatly obscured the
implications of poverty, racism, and gender inequality in the continuing
experience of violence within Aboriginal communities.'^°
Perhaps the clearest way to demonstrate the extent to which the women
survivors in the cases we have discussed are excluded from the realm of
institutional concern is to point to ways of approaching cases of intimate
violence within a restorative justice context that take a more balanced
approach. As discussed earlier,'^' Cameron J.A. incorporates into his dissent
in the Taylor appeal some of the otherwise erased knowledges and experience
of Aboriginal women, but he is restricted by the court record. While this
explicitly anti-misogynist dissent goes a significant distance within the context
of sentencing practices inside the criminal justice system, it does not, in our
opinion, move into the realm of restorative justice.
128. See, for instance. Lilies, supra note 42; Huculak, supra note 43; Point, supra note 43 at 207;
and Stuart, supra note 21.
129. Hunt, supra note 13.
130. See Elizabeth Adjin-Tetty, "Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders: Balancing Offenders' Needs,
the Interests of Victims and Society, and the Decolonization of Aboriginal Peoples" in this
volume.
131. See text accompanying notes 121-5 in this article.
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At a minimum, restorative justice in the context of intimate violence would
reflect the needs, experiences, and knowledges ofthe survivors of these crimes. It
would also bring new financial and human resources to the community'^^ rather
than relying on the already taxed resources of communities in crisis. It would
carry real consequences for offenders who repeatedly break conditions set by the
community, and it would also be based in a feminist praxis of empowerment and
social and economic justice for Aboriginal women and their communities.'^^
The patterns of violence against Aboriginal women are absent from the texts
of judicially convened sentencing circle decisions in favour of an institutional
focus on the possibility of ameliorating the rate of incarceration of Aboriginal
men. The realm of institutional concern being established in these cases thereby
re-victimizes the Aboriginal survivors of intimate violence, excluding Aboriginal
women from the "community" that is empowered to decide the proper way to
deal with Aboriginal offenders.'^'* There are serious dangers inherent in
assuming that the multi-layered difficulties faced by Aboriginal peoples in
Canada can be easily, or cheaply, solved. Reading the texts of judgments written
about Aboriginal intimate violence, it becomes possible to see how Canadian
judicial practices mask these multi-layered difficulties rather than seeking
wholeheartedly to address them. In this example, it seems that Aboriginal
women are being placed at risk by a practice that is textually constructed as
helping Aboriginal communities. The violence against Aboriginal women has
been minimized within, or erased from, these texts, thereby permitting judges to
proclaim the healing effects of sentencing circle practices. Solving the systemic
problem of intimate violence in Aboriginal communities, as in wider Canadian
society, will require much more extensive economic, human, social, and cultural
resources than are evident in this criminal justice model.
132. There are several examples of such restorative justice practice. See, for example, Therese
Lajeunesse, Community Holistic Circle Healing in Hollow Water Manitoba: An Evaluation
(Ottawa: Solicitor General, 1996); Therese Lajeunesse, Community Holistic Circle Healing:
Hollow Water First Nation (Ottawa: Solicitor General, 1993); and Pennell and Burford,
"Family Group Decision-Making," infra note 133 (all cited works).
133. Perhaps the best example of restorative justice in cases of intimate violence in Canada has
been rooted in child welfare, where the focus is first on the needs of the most vulnerable
members of the family, accompanied by a holistic approach that sees solutions in healing the
whole family. See Pennell and Burford, "Feminist Praxis," supra note 41; Joan Pennell and
Gale Burford, "Family Group Decision-Making and Family Violence," in Gale Burford and
Joe Hudson, eds.. Family Group Conferencing: New Directions in Community-Centred Child
and Family Practice (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2000), 171; Joan Pennell and Gale
Burford, "Family Group Decision Making: Protecting Children and Women" (2000) 79
Child Welfare 131; and Joan Pennell and Gale Burford, Family Group Decision Making
Project: Implementation Report Summary (St. John's, NF: Memorial University of
Newfoundland, 1995).
134. To observe that women's interests are being marginalized in these cases is not to downplay
the seriousness of the problem of Aboriginal incarceration, nor do we necessarily endorse
current Canadian incarceration practices as an appropriate response.

